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Introduction and a personal reflection on INTERREG 
 
The INTERREG programme is the Community Initiative which provides funds 
for cross-border and regional cooperation. European Commission (EC) officials 
responsible for the programme and academics were both part of the audience 
when this chapter was first presented at a conference. It was one of a series of 
three papers presented by academics that had all been quite critical of local 
examples INTERREG initiatives. As we left the conference room I overheard 
one of the EC officials saying to his colleague that he was ‘not used to all this 
criticism’.  His colleague responded that he felt many of our academic criticisms 
were unreasonable and would not be so well received by an audience mainly 
comprised of INTERREG officials.  I was surprised to overhear these comments 
as whilst my conference paper had been critical some of the observations had 
already been made in evaluation reports and were partly related to the 
difficulty of developing co-operation between regions in northern France and 
southern England separated by a substantial sea border with significantly 
different local economies and political structures. I entered into a discussion 
with the two officials which revealed our rather different viewpoints on how 
the effects of INTERREG should be assessed. For the EC officials INTERREG is 
part of the wider political process to promote cohesion in the European Union 
(EU). Providing co-operative programmes are well managed financially and 
funds are used as intended then the exchange of knowledge, innovation, people 
and good practice that INTERREG supports was viewed positively by the EC 
officials because it contributed to the wider goals of integration and cohesion.  
From my academic perspective and interests in political geography I was more 
inclined to judge INTERREG in terms of how it affected governance and power 
relations in the regions concerned. For the EC officials my criticisms were 
viewed as short term problems that were not an issue providing they did not 
hinder the longer term goal of integration.  For me the criticisms of INTERREG 
were an essential part of a wider analysis aiming to understand how regional 
co-operation would effect national, regional and local governance and 
contribute to the on going transformation of state forms in Europe. 
 
Clearly, therefore, INTERREG can be viewed from very different political 
perspectives and perhaps not surprisingly EC officials adopted a rather 
different viewpoint compared to academic commentators.  These differing 
perspectives can also be found by comparing chapters in this book.  This 
chapter argues that the Franco-British INTERREG programme contains a 
number of contradictions that are linked to the rescaling of governance in the 
EU and the power relations between the key organisations and different scales 
of government involved in implementing the programme.   
 
The research on which the paper is based has taken place at a number of times 
for over a decade (see Church and Reid 1995, 1996 and1999).  Prior to 1999 I was 
based at the University of London and the research methods mainly involved 
document analysis and key informant interviews.  For this period I was an 
‘outsider’ to the INTERREG initiative as my University was not in a position to 
bid for INTERREG cross border funds.  In 2000 I moved to the University of 
Brighton which is based in the City of Brighton and Hove a local government 
district eligible for funds under INTERREG II and III. So for the last seven years 
I have been an ‘insider’ working in an institution which has been a partner in 
initiatives funded by INTERREG III A, B and C. This enabled close observation 
of how INTERREG projects have been developed and implemented. In 
addition, I have been the University’s project manager for an INTERREG IIIC 
GROW project researching community participation in brownfield land 
regeneration in the high growth regions of south east England, Nord Brabant in 
southern Netherlands, Bologna in Italy and Malapolska in southern Poland. My 
research methods have continued to involve key informant interviews and 
document analysis but I have also undertaken participant observation 
recording my experiences in informal and formal meetings concerned with 
INTERREG projects involving the University of Brighton.  My positionality at 
times involved complex power relations where I was supporting University 
bids for funds whilst seeking to understand the wider impacts of the 
INTERREG programme.  Nevertheless, by drawing on my earlier experiences 
as a critical ‘outsider’ and by contextualising analysis in theoretical and 
conceptual writing on changing governance in the EU I have sought to maintain 
a critical perspective on Franco-British cross border co-operation.  
 
The next two sections of this paper summarise the development of the 
INTERREG programme and co-operation on the Franco-British border over the 
last twenty years. This is followed by a consideration of how cross-border co-
operation can be understood by drawing on conceptual discussions of changing 
European governance and the power relations between different tiers of 
government.  These conceptual ideas provide a context for an in depth 
consideration of the INTERREG IIIA initiative on the Franco-British border 
which highlights some of the key problems and contradictions of cross border 
co-operation. 
 
Franco-British co-operation INTERREG 1 in a ‘maritime region’  
 
The EC has made Community Initiative funds available for cross border co-
operation through three INTERREG programmes. INTERREG I ran between 
1990-94, II from 1995-99 and III from 2000-2007.  INTERREG IV is currently 
being developed and will run from 2008-2013. In the UK INTERREG is typified 
by a process of ‘enlargement’ as the number of regions eligible for funds has 
grown from just one in the first programme.  This has been accompanied on the 
British side of the border by a growing ‘centralisation’ of control as national 
government organisations rather than local councils have increasingly managed 
and overseen the programme. 
 
Under INTERREG 1 Franco-British co-operation had some features that were 
highly distinctive compared to elsewhere in the EU.  INTERREG was initially 
designed only for terrestrial borders and maritime borders were not eligible for 
funding.  Between 1990 and 1992 the English county of Kent and the French 
region of Nord Pas de Calais embarked on an intensive campaign of lobbying 
the EC for their inclusion in the INTERREG programme despite being 
separated by a maritime border (Church and Reid 1994).  Other EU regions 
separated by a maritime border were involved in similar lobbying. A number of 
key arguments were used to support the Franco-British case.  The opening of 
the Channel Tunnel in 1994 provided a fixed link between Kent and Nord Pas 
de Calais which these areas claimed meant they should be treated as having a 
terrestrial border.  The case for INTERREG support was also based on the fact 
that cross border co-operative initiatives had been significantly advanced in 
Kent and Nord Pas de Calais in the 1980s well before the INTERREG 
programme was announced.  The Franco-British Channel Fixed Link Treaty 
signed by national governments was ratified in 1987 and formed the agreement 
to construct the Channel Tunnel.  Also in 1987 the Transmanche region was 
designated as including Kent County Council and Nord Pas de Calais region 
who signed a joint accord which identified policy areas where the two 
authorities felt they could co-operate including commercial, education, 
transport, tourism and economic links.  The aim of the accord was partly to 
ensure The Transmanche region maximised the benefits linked to the Channel 
Tunnel and the emerging Single European Market (Church and Reid 1995).  
This was the first initiative of its type involving a French and UK region. By 
September 1990 the Joint Accord was further formalised into a Transfrontier 
Development Programme (TDP) which identified specific cross border co-
operative initiatives for which funding would be sought.  Kent County Council 
and Nord Pas de Calais region, therefore, based their case for INTERREG 
funding not just on the ‘terrestrial’ link of the Channel Tunnel but also the 
existing political frameworks supporting cross border co-operation in the 
Transmanche region (Church and Reid 1996).  The lobbying was rewarded in 
May 1992 two years after INTERREG I had formally started when the EC 
granted formal approval for the Transmanche region to receive INTERREG 
funding. This meant that Kent County Council was the only area of Great 
Britain that received funding under INTERREG 1.  In the EU 4 other maritime 
borders also managed to secure funding (Interact 2005). 
 
The Transmanche region is indicative of how cross-border co-operation often 
predates the availability of EC funds but clearly INTERREG funds have been a 
key factor in stimulating many of the cross border coalitions that have emerged.  
The initial co-operation in Transmanche region prior to INTERREG was driven 
by a combination of changing economic and infrastructural circumstances. 
Cross border co-operation emerged despite marked political and economic 
differences between Kent and Nord Pas de Calais (Collier and Vickerman 2001). 
In the 1980s the socialists were the ruling party in a region with a population of 
nearly 4 million.  Kent County Council with a population of just under 2 million 
was controlled by the conservatives and despite job losses in the recessions of 
the early 1980s and 1990s it was still a relatively prosperous part of England 
(Eurostat 1993).  In Nord Pas de Calais in 1990 manufacturing still accounted 
for over a quarter of employment compared to 16% in Kent (Government Office 
for the South East 1994). The effects of deindustrialisation and high levels of 
unemployment meant Nord Pas de Calais was in receipt of Objective 1 and 2 
funding from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF).  These 
economic differences have continued into the more recent period and in 2003 
the unemployment rate in Kent was 2.3% compared to 12.8% in the Nord 
department (INSEE 2005)   
 
Competing to co-operate - INTERREG II and III on the Franco-British border 
 
Under INTERREG 1 the Transmanche region had a total budget of 54m ECU of 
which 40% was from the programme and 60% match funded from local and 
regional governments.  The financial benefits for the Transmanche region of 
INTERREG 1 funds meant that other UK regions were keen to be involved in 
the INTERREG II programme especially as it was now clear that maritime 
regions could be eligible for funds (AEBR 1996).  A complex lobbying process 
emerged in 1993-4 as a number of English and French local government 
organisations sought to become eligible for funds.  A number of French and 
British towns had already formed informal co-operative groupings in the early 
1990s. In 1993 a local economic accord was signed between the northern French 
towns of Caen, Le Havre and Rouen and the southern English towns of 
Bournemouth, Poole, Portsmouth and Southampton. This grouping was termed 
the Transmanche Metropole and was partly designed to contribute to the 
lobbying campaign to obtain INTERREG eligibility (Church and Reid 1996).  
Lobbying for eligibility involved coastal regions on both sides of the Channel 
and was a complex process seeking to influence the Regional Policy of the 
European Parliament, the Assembly of European Regions and the INTERREG 
management committee.  The Transmanche Metropole towns were in the 
English counties of Hampshire and Dorset and the French regions of Haute-
Normandie and Basse-Normandie all of which were applying for eligibility 
(Church and Reid 1996). The Transmanche Metropole grouping and the existing 
Transmanche region appeared to constitute an influential lobby. Squeezed 
between these groupings geographically were the English counties of East and 
West Sussex and the French region of Picardie. East Sussex were not optimistic 
about their chances of gaining INTERREG funding despite having signed an 
economic accord with the French Department of Seine Maritime since these two 
authorities were not part of a well defined grouping like the Transmanche 
Metropole (Church and Reid 1996).  Picardie was applying for eligibility partly 
on the basis of co-operation with the English county of Essex which is north of 
the river Thames and has few maritime links to Picardie.   
 
On 1 July 1994 when the list of border regions eligible for INTERREG II funding 
was published the outcomes for the coastal regions of northern France and 
southern Britain were a mix of the predictable and the unexpected.  As expected 
due to involvement in INTERREG I the Transmanche region containing Kent 
and Nord Pas de Calais was on the list.  Less expected were the other eligible 
regions. From the French region of Picardie only the coastal department of 
Somme was granted eligibility along with the Department of Seine Maritime in 
the region of Haute Normandie. The two departments were eligible for co-
operation with the English County of East Sussex and these three authorities 
now termed themselves the Rives-Manche region (Church and Reid 1995). The 
English county of Essex along with the counties and regions covered by the 
Transmanche Metropole were not on the list of eligible regions. The towns of 
Rouen and Le Havre, however, were part of the Transmanche Metropole but 
are located in the Department of Seine Maritime and so were now eligible for 
funding. East Sussex viewed their inclusion on the list as unexpected but a 
significant achievement. One of the French Departments was initially unaware 
they were included on the list as the application process had been dealt with by 
the French regional agency DATAR (Church and Reid 1996).  
 
East Sussex county council felt their success was partly based on the economic 
arguments used to support their case which stressed cross border co-operation 
would aid the exisitng links between the ports of Dieppe and Newhaven and 
the shared problems of stagnating tourism resorts. In addition, East Sussex 
believed that central government had been a significant influence in their 
success.  The central government bodies involved in the application process for 
eligibility had indicated they would prefer INTERREG II to focus on areas that 
were eligible for national regional policy funding which included some coastal 
towns in East Sussex and Kent but not areas in the Transmanche Metropole 
(Church and Reid 1996).  The outcome of a complex lobbying and application 
process had resulted in an expansion of eligible areas compared to INTERREG 1 
but this was accompanied by central government in the UK having an 
increasing influence on the evolution of the INTERREG programme in the 
English regions.  In the 1990s the desire of UK central government to act as a 
‘gate keeper’ over EU funding had already been noted (Martin and Pearce 
1993).  Under INTERREG I Kent County Council had considerable opportunity 
to  determine the direction of the programme (Church and Reid 1994). By 
contrast, for INTERREG II the final bid for funding for the Transmanche region  
was submitted by the centrally appointed Government Office for the South East 
(1994). 
 
Obtaining eligibility for INTERREG II was clearly a highly competitive process 
in southern England and northern France involving intensive lobbying and the 
formation of complex temporary alliances. Indeed, this highlights a key 
contradiction of co-operative cross border initiatives which is that they also 
stimulate intensive periods of competitive political activity as local and regional 
organisations seek to gain eligibility for funding. Some organisations benefit 
from this process whilst others receive little gain and resources are diverted 
from other local democratic priorities (Church and Reid 1995). This history of 
INTERREG policy evolution especially the increasing involvement of central 
government agencies in the UK highlights the need to consider not only how 
cross border co-operation is influenced by relations between tiers of 
government but also by the interactions between agencies at the same scale of 
local and regional governance who in the process of seeking eligibility for 
funding have been competing to co-operate. 
 
 The value of being successful in 1994 f was further reinforced when INTERREG 
III for 2000-2006 was developed because the eligible areas in southern England 
and northern France effectively remained the same.  The total number of 
programmes funded in the EU by INTERREG I was 31 and this rose to 59 under 
INTERREG II but fell to 53 under INTERREG III (Interact 2005).  Rather than 
enlarging the number of eligible regions on internal EU borders INTERREG III 
resulted in mergers of programmes on certain borders and a decline in the total 
number of programmes.  The Franco-British border was an example of where 
programme merger occurred and the Transmanche and Rives-Manche regions 
were integrated into a single programme of Franco-British co-operation 
involving the same regions and counties.  In certain circumstances two 
adjoining counties in England (West Sussex and Surrey) and four Departments 
in France  (Aisne, Oise, Eure and Calvados) could become involved in 
INTERREG programmes but the reality was that the Franco-British area eligible 
for INTERREG funding remained static from 1994-2006. 
 
INTERREG IV for 2007-2013 will involve a significant expansion of the regions 
eligible for funding on EU internal borders.  Areas eligible for funds on the 
Franco-British border have effectively doubled (Local Government 
International Bureau 2006) to include the majority of the coastal regions of 
northern France and southern England. Seven French departments and 9 
English counties will be the main recipients of INTERREG IV funding 
compared to 2 counties and 4 departments under INTERREG III. Furthermore, 
the Franco-British INTERREG IV initiative is now a France-British-Belgian-
Dutch programme as two coastal authorities from the Netherlands and three 
from Belgium are now involved in the programme. Key informant interviewees 
felt the budget is unlikely to expand to a similar degree meaning that those 
areas eligible under INTERREG III are unlikely to have the same funds at their 
disposal.  The Franco-British border received significant funds from INTERREG 
III and the total budget of 206m EUR for 2000-2006 (108m EUR from the ERDF) 
was the second largest budget for an EU internal border programme exceeded 
only by the 1075m EUR budget for the Spain-Portugal border (Interact 2005). A 
later section of this paper examines the detail of how this INTERREG III budget 
was allocated but before a more in-depth analysis is presented the next section 
outlines how the evolution of cross border co-operation on the Franco-British 
border and in the EU more generally has been considered in wider conceptual 
discussions of changing governance in the EU. The value of examining this 
wider literature is that it highlights possible explanations for the features of 
INTERREG programmes which can inform the detailed empirical analysis 
presented later in the paper. 
 
European governance and the politics of cross border co-operation 
 
The discussion so far has highlighted the contradiction of significant 
competition being a feature of the evolution of cross border co-operation. This 
was also noted in some of the early studies of the economic dimensions of cross 
border co-operation. Cappelin (1992) argues that peripheral border regions may 
become more economically integrated with core regions through initiatives to 
support cross border co-operation but peripherality can also be accentuated 
through competition between border regions for policy resources. During the 
early phases of INTERREG the contradictions of cross border co-operation were 
often considered in the context of wider debates over the emergence of 
networked governance in the EU (Marsh and Rhodes1992, Church and Reid 
1996).  Clearly cross border co-operation can be seen as one example of the 
growing international networks involving local and regional government in the 
1980s and 1990s (Van der Wusten 1995).  Indeed, the growth of such networks 
has been linked to a wider internationalisation of local and regional 
government activity (Goldsmith 1993).  During this period quite optimistic 
conclusions were sometimes drawn concerning the potential of networks to 
allow local and regional bodies to develop alternative strategies that were to 
some degree free from the constraints of central government (Van den Wusten 
1995, Batten 1995). Networks and co-operation based on accountable leadership 
have been shown to result in significant policy innovation (Bennett and Krebs 
1994).   
 
Other commentators were more pessimistic arguing that networks could create 
new constraints and concentrate power in certain agencies (Marsh and Rhodes 
1992, Nijkamp 1993).  Cochrane (1993) noted that the emergence of complex 
coalitions involving local government raised concerns of accountability as the 
resources of local government were increasingly influenced by other tiers of 
government rather than issues of local concern. Detailed analyses of networked 
governance noted that there was often a highly selective process determining 
who was involved in co-operative networks. Thus networks and cooperation 
can result in a concentration of power in small bureaucratic groups. As Dang-
Nguyen et. al. (1995 p.94) note ‘the lack of transparency democratic legitimation 
and the control of ‘networked policy making’ suggest that the development of 
these new political institutional forms represents only a transitory stage on the 
way to an emergent European state’. 
 
More recent discussions of the changing nature of EU governance have further 
extended the understanding of the significance of network-based governance 
that often involves new spatial arrangements such as cross border 
collaborations. Indeed, new cross border spaces have developed in many 
locations outside Europe (Perkmann and Sum 2002). The nature of INTERREG 
has partly evolved in response to wider changes in the organisation of 
structural funds and also the enlargement of the EU which has markedly 
changed the nature of both external and internal borders (Interact 2005). The 
evolution of INTERREG, however, is also shaped by wider changes in EU 
governance. Jessop (2002, 2005) suggests that changes in national and EU 
governance structures are leading to the emergence of what he terms a 
Schumpeterian Workfare Postnational Regime in which networks and 
partnerships, often promoted by EU organisations, play a key role in the 
development of multilevel metagovernance.  Jessop (2005) argues that a type of 
post national statehood is emerging in Europe and multilevel metagovernance 
is used by national and European tiers of government to maintain control of 
local and regional politics through a system of ‘decentralised steering’ which 
tends to promote neo-liberal welfare agendas. This has resulted in a rescaling of 
institutional activities as certain spatial scales of governance become best suited 
for particular types of political intervention.  Jessop (2005 p.5 ) notes that 
‘whereas promoting micro-social conditions for economic competitiveness 
maybe better handled now at sub national or cross-border levels, large national 
states are still better equipped in principle to deal with problems of territorial 
integration, social cohesion and social exclusion because of their fisco-financial 
powers and redistributive capacities’.  From this perspective, therefore, cross 
border spaces and networks of co-operation must be understood as part of the 
wider restructuring and rescaling of governance and statehood that will involve 
shifts of power and control between tiers of government as multilevel 
governance develops across the EU. The concept of multilevel governance and 
has received considerable debate and criticisms but is still viewed as essential 
for identifying ‘the tensions between representative democracy on the one 
hand, and partnerships and deliberative forms of democracy on the other’ 
(Eckerberg and Joas p.411).  The debates over multilevel governance and 
European political transformation more generally, confirm the need to consider 
how cross border initiatives such as INTERREG are shaped by the evolving 
power relations between and within the changing tiers of governance that are 
linked to the ongoing political rescaling associated with multi level governance.  
 
The early writing on networks and cross border co-operation in the 1990s along 
with more recent interpretations of the changes in European governance  
indicate that an examination of cross-border cooperation must search for 
contradictory tendencies that may emerge and also recognise that whilst co-
operation opens up new options for local and regional authorities to act more 
independently it creates new constraints as national and European tiers of 
government, often through their appointed ‘decentralised’ agencies, seek to 
control new forms of co-operation.  These conceptual writings along with the 
empirical material presented earlier in this paper on the evolution of 
INTERREG on the Franco-British border suggest that a full understanding of 
the implications of cross border co-operation requires an analysis of how power 
relations between different tiers of government shape these co-operative 
programmes and also which organisations acquire the power to influence the 
nature and direction of cross border policies. Given the complexities of power 
theory (Clegg 1989, Haugaard 2002, Morriss 2002) and the complex nature of 
power in local and regional situations (Allen 2003, Coles and Church 2007) it is 
not the intention here to develop a detailed analysis of all the power modalities 
and tactics linked to INTERREG. Instead the aim of the next section of the paper 
is to explore issues of power broadly and empirically through a more detailed 
discussion of the nature of INTERREG IIIA. This seeks to establish how the 
nature of cross border co-operation is influenced by the power relations 
between tiers of government and the goals of specific organisations acting at the 
regional and local scale. 
 
Power, politics and INTERREG IIIA 
 
The organisational structures and expenditure outcomes of INTERREG IIIA 
provide insights into the power relations that shaped the nature of the 
programme and reveal a number of criticisms of INTEREREG both in the 
Franco-British example and more generally. The whole  INTERREG III 
programme had three strands and IIIA, the largest strand in terms of budget, 
was for adjacent regions to develop cross border co-operation. The other 
strands were mainly for regions that are not adjacent with IIIB for  transnational 
co-operation and IIIC for interregional co-operation.  Figure 1 outlines the 
organisational structure of the Franco-British INTERREG IIIA programme and 
indicates a significant difference in how INTEEREG was managed in the two 
countries.  The Managing Authority for France was the elected regional tier of 
government the Conseil Regional de Haute-Normandie.  In the UK the 
managing authority was the Government Office for South East England (GOSE)  
which is regionally based agency of central government.  The increasing 
influence of central government on INTERREG in the UK (Church and Reid 
1996) is reflected in this management structure.  As one key informant 
interviewee from a UK local council noted ‘when the French argue it is usually 
tensions between the regions and departments….in England its us getting 
irritated with GOSE’s desire to control’.  
Central government influence is also exerted in the French regions but through 
the presence on the steering committee of the Prefets who act as central 
government’s representatives in the three French regions. The programme 
organisation shown in Figure 1 was also designed so that Franco-British cross-
border co-operation  could adopt a bilateral and parallel approach to individual 
project assessment followed by negotiations over short listed projects in the 
Steering Committee.  In interviews with some key informants this bilateral 
approach was seen as overly bureaucratic compared to the alternative of 
integrated project assessment. Other informants, however, felt it ensured 
projects were rigorously assessed prior to funding.  The debate over the value 
of parallel compared to integrated management systems for INTERREG has 
been raised in comparative evaluations. The Interact (2005 p.99) study 
compared a large number of the mid term evaluations for INTERREG III and 
concluded as follows: 
‘Over successive programming periods, there has been an overall trend for 
INTERREG programmes to move towards more integrated and shared 
management and delivery systems, although programmes have progressed 
down this route at different speeds and to varying degrees. The proposed 
European groupings of cross-border cooperation (EGCC) provide a potential 
means for more programmes to develop further in this direction, creating joint 
structures with a legal status. It is important at this stage to explore whether 
these structures are, in practice, suitably framed to resolve the difficulties they 
have been introduced to address. Although well-intentioned, the EC’s 
proposals may not in fact go far enough towards addressing the real causes of 
INTERREG programming difficulties, including incompatibilities between 
different national funding regimes. It may also be useful to explore different 
models of INTERREG management, to understand the merits not just of joint 
structures but also parallel management arrangements. It may be that, given 
good coordination, parallel management models to cross-border cooperation, 
for example, provide a valid, realistic and sustainable solution to INTERREG 
management which accommodates the realities of working in a multinational 
setting. These questions require further investigation.’ 
 
 Whatever the advantages or disadvantages of parallel or integrated  
approaches, the form of programme organisation that emerged in the Franco-
British example clearly reflected not only the differences in national funding 
structures mentioned in the above quote but also the interactions between tiers 
of government who are seeking to control the management and implementation 
of INTERREG. 
 
Central government organisations are clearly  a key source of power 
influencing the nature of cross border regional co-operation. The steering group 
for Franco-British co-operation, however, also included a considerable degree 
representation from local and regional organisations. Power relations between 
these organisations were a crucial influence on how the programme developed 
and the nature of expenditure outcomes.  The steering committee for 
INTERREG IIIA in France and the UK had 21 members with the chair being a 
Franco-British partner who was the representative of the managing authority 
(see Figure 1).  The 10 French members were all drawn from central-regional, 
regional and local statutory organisations and included the 3 Prefets for the 
regions, the 3 presidents of the Regional councils and the 4 Presidents of the 
general Councils for the Departments.  The 10 English members include three 
representatives from regionally based central government organisations two 
from GOSE and one from the South East England Development Agency. Local 
government on the steering committee is comprised on four representatives 
from the largest councils. The remaining three members represent small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs), further/higher education and the voluntary 
sector.  This appears on the surface to be indicative of a more pluralistic 
structure than in France designed to include perspectives on the steering 
committee beyond those of government bodies.  This arrangement, however, 
does not mean that the power to influence and benefit from INTERREG is 
evenly distributed amongst the sectors represented on the steering group and 
the uneven power relations that emerged are partly reflected in the INTERREG 
IIIA budget and expenditure patterns. 
 
The allocation of the budget for Franco-British co-operation under INTERREG 
IIIA was meant to be guided by six strategic objectives and four budgetary 
priority areas (interreg 3A 2004).  The six strategic objectives were: 
 
• Developing a wider maritime region and its rural and urban areas 
• Reinforcing the cohesion of the cross-border area bordering the Channel 
and promotion of project contributing to the competitiveness of the 
region and the creation of employment 
• Involving citizens more closely and taking account of their needs 
• Supporting sustainable development of this area 
• Promoting the use of information and communication technology 
• Promoting equal opportunities and social inclusion 
 
Whilst these strategic objectives appear ambitious in reality budget expenditure 
was more closely related to the four priorities (MC2 2006).  Priority 1 was to 
strengthen cross-border co-opration in the service of the citizen, priority 2  
promoted balanced spatial development and priority 3  promoted an attractive 
and welcoming region. The final priority was technical assistance which 
accounted for only 7% of expenditure. The mid-term evaluation for Franco-
British co-operation noted that expenditure was spread amongst the three main 
priorities with 20% occurring under priority 1, 31% under priority 2 and 42% 
under priority 3 (MC2 2004).  Expenditure, however, had not been spread 
amongst the strategic objectives with only 23% being allocated to the last three 
objectives listed above (MC2 2004).  Indeed, the consultants undertaking the 
2006 update to the mid term evaluation for Franco-British co-operation noted 
that programme organisation had concentrated on budgetary priorities but had 
lost sight of the strategic objectives  so that some objectives had only been 
partially addressed (MC2 2006). Similar criticisms have been made of 
INTERREG more generally and the comparative study of mid term evaluations 
noted that often programmes lacked strategic vision  (Interact 2005).  The 
emphasis on budgetary issues in the Franco-British programme, however, 
meant that the mid term evaluation noted that budgetary programming was 
well executed.   
 
Despite this, the Franco-British programme still experienced a significant 
degree of ‘deadweight’ referring to projects that might well have occurred 
without funding and so were not additional.  The mid term evaluation of the 
Franco British IIIA programme (MC2 2004) suggested as many as 25% of 
projects might have occurred anyway and so were not additional.  General 
discussions of INTERREG stress that ‘more so than other Structural Fund 
programmes, INTERREG programmes are additional to domestic policy 
initiatives. They are catalysts – providing opportunities which lead either to 
new and additional activities or to pre-existing priorities being taken forward in 
a different way’ (Interact 2005).  This quote however, indicates the difficulty of 
establishing if an INTERREG project is ‘deadweight’ or additional.  If the 
projects funded by INTERREG are long standing local priorities but were taken 
forward in a slightly different way under INTERREG that would fulfil the 
additionality criteria. 
 
More generally, the nature of expenditure outcomes and project funding also 
reflected the power and influence of the key organisations involved in the 
programme.  By the time of the mid term evaluation in 2004 42% of INTERREG 
IIIA funds for Franco-British co-operation had been programmed.  Perhaps as 
might be expected a significant proportion of funds (42%) had been allocated to 
projects where local/regional government was the lead partner.  A further 11% 
was allocated to projects lead by ‘other public’ organisations (e.g. the public 
health sector) and 20% to voluntary organisations many of which were projects 
to reinforce cohesion and involve citizens.  More surprisingly, 24% of the 
budget had been programmed for projects led by universities whereas only 4% 
had gone  to projects led by private business or chambers of commerce. (MC2). 
The difficulties of involving SMEs is a problem common to INTERREG 
programmes  (Perkmann 2003) stemming in part  from the demands financial 
reporting places on SME partners and the billing procedures on INTERREG 
(MC2 2004). Also some programmes have been wary of SMEs as partners as 
support for SMEs from INTERREG could conflict with the Lisbon Treaty's 
competitiveness agenda. The high proportion of funds programmed to 
initiatives lead by universities may reflect the fact that some were large 
scientific research projects.  Universities, however, had been significant 
beneficiaries under INTERREG II from the Franco British border. More 
generally, Universities had the organisational and financial structures which 
allowed them to bid for and manage large INTERREG projects. One key 
informant noted ‘I’m not sure how universities have got so much funding this 
time around …..their position on the steering and monitoring committees must 
have made a difference’.  The influence of universities on the Franco-British 
INTERREG programme emerged slowly over the three programmes but clearly 
by the time of  IIIA the local universities  had developed the power of their own 
internal resources and their involvement in programme planning networks to 
ensure they were heavily involved in the programme. 
 
Whilst university projects may possibly result in a high degree of co-operation 
between institutions and academic staff they may not directly address one of 
the criticisms of Franco-British INTERREG initiatives which was the lack of 
public awareness of cross border co-operation. An ex ante evaluation of 
INTERREG IIIA concluded that the France-British programme was ‘primarily 
directed towards organisations and local enterprises rather than local 
populations and citizens or residents, who benefit indirectly from the 
programme rather than feeling involved’ (interreg 3 A 2004). A number of the 
projects led by  voluntary sector bodies have resulted in an expansion of 
exchange activities between local communities some of which are quite 
deprived.  Under INTERREG IIIA there has been an exchange of community 
leaders and members involved in the regeneration of former mining settlements 
in northern France and the east Kent coalfields.  Despite such initiatives, 
however, the significant proportion of funds programmed under INTERREG 
111A for local government and universities is unlikely to significantly alter the 
perception that it is an expert driven programme which may benefit local 
residents but will not directly involve them. The power relations and 
organisational structures that have evolved in connection with the Franco-
British INTERREG initiative have tended to result in a situation whereby 
certain types of institution are the main beneficiaries of INTERREG resulting in 
a relatively low level of awareness of the programme amongst local 
populations. 
 
Conclusion: INTERREG, long term cohesion and short term contradictions 
 
A number of the criticisms made of the Franco-British INTEEREG programme 
in this chapter reflect the contradictions that arise when local and regional 
governments get involved in ‘competitive co-operation’. The marked expansion 
of the eligible Franco-British authorities under INTERREG IV may well 
heighten the competitive dimensions of the programme. Equally, many of the 
criticisms can be given a different interpretation if seen from the perspective of 
the EC officials discussed in the introduction to the chapter who tended to view 
INTERREG as part of a long term EC inspired drive for cohesion.  For example, 
some of the organisational weaknesses of Franco-British INTERREG identified 
in evaluations (interreg 3A, MC2 2004, MC2 2006) can also be presented in a 
more positive manner. It has long been argued that competition amongst local 
and regional authorities for funds stimulates the mergence of innovative and 
high quality policy initiatives (Department of the Environment  1994). The lack 
of attention to strategic objectives could be presented as symptomatic of an 
initiative seeking to develop a flexible approach that responds to changing local 
circumstances.  The bilateral and parallel project assessment procedures that 
have been portrayed as bureaucratically cumbersome could also be seen as 
providing a robust and critical approach to funding decisions.  ‘Deadweight’ 
projects that were not additional may have a positive dimension if they move 
forward identified local priorities.   
 Similarly the critiques of the power relations and politics associated with 
INTERREG III can also be portrayed as having an appropriate justification.  
Increased central government involvement may avoid poor management by 
local or regional authorities. The significant influence on the programme of only 
certain local organisations such as local government and universities may result 
in initiatives that address local priorities even if this results in a lack of 
awareness of the initiative amongst local residents.  Evaluations of INTERREG 
have often recognised that whilst weaknesses exist it is important to take a 
broad view and acknowledge the long term gains.  For example, the 
comparative study of INTERREG III mid-term evaluations concluded that ‘The 
Community Added Value of INTERREG is difficult to dispute. Supporting 
enhanced integration between EU Member States and the balanced and 
sustainable development of the European space is clearly a distinctive area 
where supranational frameworks and initiatives can come into their own’ 
(Interact 2005 p.21).  Such a broad interpretation of INTERREG may have some 
justification although the criticisms outlined in this chapter are still important 
and cannot just be dismissed as short term problems.  The empirical evidence 
presented in this chapter indicates that an understanding of how INTERREG 
involves requires an analysis of the power relations involved.  The tensions 
between different tiers of government have been significant in shaping how 
France-British co-operation developed. Equally, the competitive dimensions to 
power relations between organisations at the same scale of local and regional 
governance have a significant impact on the nature of co-operation.  The 
argument that cross-border co-operation contributes to the ‘big picture’ of 
cohesion may be used to give a positive interpretation to INTERREG.  There is, 
however, a complex politics of uneven power relations associated with the 
process of cohesion. Local and regional, coalitions, networks and competitive 
interactions allow some institutional structures to gain a position of power 
which allows them to be the main beneficiaries of cross border co-operation.   
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